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Abstract
We consider the strategic behavior of secondary users (SUs) in a cognitive radio system where SUs opportunistically
share a single primary user (PU) band over a coverage area. The service of an SU can be interrupted by a PU in a
preemptive manner, and the interrupted SU may abandon the system or wait until the PU band is sensed available. In
the latter case, if spectrum sensing errors occur, they will cause misdetections and false alarms which impact the
system’s performance heavily. In this paper, we model this problem as a retrial queueing system with server
breakdowns and recoveries in which the interrupted SUs are treated as retrial customers. They will retry for using the
PU band after some period of time due to interruptions or misdetections. The arrival of a PU during service of an SU is
modeled as a server breakdown, and the recovery time is equivalent to the service time of this PU. We focus on the
behavior of arriving SUs who can make decisions on whether to join the system or to balk based on a natural cost
structure and the delays caused by PUs’ interruptions, which can be studied as a non-cooperative game. The
equilibrium and optimal strategies of SUs are both derived. Furthermore, to bridge the gap between the individually
and socially optimal strategies, a novel strategy of imposing an admission fee on SUs to join the retrial group is
proposed. Finally, some numerical examples are presented to show the effect of several key parameters on the system
performance.
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1 Introduction
Spectrum is recognized as one of the limited transmission
resources which face the challenges of the ever increasing
demand for higher data rates and lower latency in com-
munication networks. Cognitive radio (CR) first intro-
duced by Mitola [1] can alter its transmitter parameters
to accommodate the environment where it operates to
utilize spectrums more efficiently. The potential of cogni-
tive radio is being recognized not only by the military but
also by the commercial sector, for example, in intelligent
transportation, in cellular communications, and in public
safety.
Previous studies have shown that the utility of the
spectrum is very low under conventional static spectrum
access strategies [2]. As the users’ demands increase while
the amount of dedicated spectrum is limited, more and
more network users have to choose dynamic spectrum
*Correspondence: jtwang@bjtu.edu.cn
1Department of Mathematics, Beijing Jiaotong University, No. 3 Shang Yuan
Cun, Beijing, China
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
access (DSA) which has been considered as a viable solu-
tion to alleviate this spectrum scarcity and improve radio
communication efficiency. An amount of work focused
on the performance analysis of various systems; how-
ever, they neglect the competition between different users.
The relationship between users and operators of radio
networks is also worth considering.
There are two kinds of users in cognitive radio net-
works, namely, licensed (primary) users and unlicensed
(secondary) users. The secondary users can use the capa-
bilities of spectrum sensing, learning, and adaptation to
use the licensed spectrum to transmit, thereby enabling
coexistence and leading to higher overall spectral effi-
ciency. In general, due to the fact that in CR networks
primary users (PUs) have priorities over secondary users
(SUs) and the arrivals of PUs will interrupt the service of
SUs (if any), researchers use queueing systems with break-
downs to characterize the interruption process involved.
To SUs, the preemptive priority scheme underlying the
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CR network implies that the arrival and service of any PU
will bring a breakdown and repair process by means of
queueing way of saying.
In CR systems, in most cases, there is no centralized
controller to regulate channel access. Hence, a rational
secondary user needs to give his strategies relying on
local information and has to adapt to the environment
quickly. It is natural to form a spectrum market including
cooperation, pricing, and leasing since PUs have a limited
number of spectrum bands. In these spectrum markets,
user behaviors can be modeled and analyzed by economic
games. Tran et al. [3] studied delay-sensitive secondary
users via pricing strategies in a dynamic spectrum market
with a single PU band. Do et al. [4] considered a duopoly
market with cooperative and non-cooperative models and
provided the analysis of the pricing effect on equilib-
rium behavior of SUs by using the M/G/1 queue with
breakdown.
Game-theoretic spectrum sharing criteria could be used
to maximize both primary and secondary users’ satisfac-
tion (see [5–7]). Several studies in the literature [8–11]
considered the decentralized behavior of SUs and adopted
queueing-game approach to investigate the interactions
between PUs and SUs in the CR networks. Li and Han
[8] studied the discrete model in a more applicable way
which obtained the threshold of queue length to char-
acterize the optimal joining strategy of SUs. Do et al.
[9] investigated the socially optimal strategy of SUs in
unobserved queueing system in cognitive radio base sta-
tion. Jagannathan et al. [10] illustrated SUs utilizing white
spaces that were not used by PUs in the unobservable
case by the same model but did not consider the opti-
mization strategy. All of these works [8–10] assumed that
there is a queue in front of the PU band and the new
arrivals of SUs will enter the queue according to a first-
in-first-out (FIFO) discipline. Recently, Wang and Li [11]
considered the strategic behavior of SUs with retrials but
assumed that the interrupted SU did not leave the service
area and it would get service immediately once the occu-
pied PU completed service and left the band. It should
be noted that, in all the aforementioned papers, spectrum
sensing is assumed to be perfect. None of these works con-
sidered sensing failure problem although sensing failures
occur in practice and have non-ignorable impact on the
system.
Indeed, spectrum sensing plays a vital role in CR net-
works due to unreliability of wireless channels and users’
congestions. In principle, spectrum sensing is imperfect.
When an idle band is sensed busy, a false alarm is said to
occur. A misdetection refers to the situation that a busy
band is sensed idle. These two kinds of errors have sig-
nificant effects on the performance of CR systems. The
probability of a false alarm and that of a misdetection
should be kept below a certain level to guarantee the
QoS of PUs and also SUs, i.e., the system performance is
acceptable. In [12–18], the authors took imperfect sensing
into account. Hoang et al. [12] considered a CR sys-
tem with one single slotted channel sharing by a PU
and an SU, and the problem was formulated as a par-
tially observable Markov decision process. It was shown
that the optimal control policies could achieve significant
performance gain. In [14], a two-dimensional discrete-
time Markov chain is used to model a multiple-channel
CR system with imperfect sensing. In [15], the multiple-
channel CR system with unreliable spectrum sensing was
discussed and the authors employed a two-dimensional
continuous-time Markov chain model to analyze the sys-
tem. However, strategic behavior of SUs has not been
taken into account in these studies and the above mod-
els cannot reflect the decentralized behavior of SUs along
with the opportunistic sharing operation in practice.
In this paper, we focus on the strategic behavior of SUs
in CR networks from a game-theory point of view. More
specifically, we consider the general carrier sense multiple
access (CSMA) protocol arising from wireless communi-
cation networks. The basic idea of this CSMA protocol
lies in the fact that packets start transmission only if no
transmission is ongoing and “listen before talk” protocol is
adopted. That is, every user before attempting any trans-
mission listens whether somebody else is already using the
channel, avoiding the possible collision. To characterize
these factors, wemodel the CR system as a constant retrial
queueing system with server breakdowns, where SUs get
access to the PU band according to “listen before talk” pro-
tocol as retrial customers. The PU band is considered as a
server, and the PUs have the higher priority over all SUs.
When the PU arrives, it will occupy the PU band imme-
diately no matter whether the band is serving an SU or is
in an idle state. Under the assumption of imperfect spec-
trum sensing, an extensive study of the Nash equilibrium
and the socially optimal strategies for all SUs is carried out
in this paper. Besides, to use the PU band more efficiently
and eliminate the difference between the equilibrium and
the socially optimal strategies, a novel approach of impos-
ing an appropriate admission fee for SUs that decide to
join the orbit is proposed under sensing failure. In this
way, it is feasible to induce individually optimizing SUs to
behave in a socially optimal way.
The works of Jagannathan et al. [10] and Wang and
Li [11] are closely related to this paper. The differences
between this paper and Jagannathan et al. [10] are as
follows. (1) Jagannathan et al. [10] did not consider the
optimization strategy. (2) It did not consider the sensing
failure problem. Compared toWang and Li [11], this paper
assumes that the interrupted SUwill leave the service zone
and go back to retrial orbit as a head SU in the retrial
queue. Therefore, a new arriving SU has a chance to utilize
the PU band directly if the PU band is idle upon arrival.
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In the work of Wang and Li [11], they assumed that the
interrupted SU would not leave the service area and it will
get service immediately once the occupied PU completes
his service. As a result, the new arrivals of SUs during this
period (the waiting period of interrupted SU in the ser-
vice area) have to enter the retrial orbit for later attempts.
Evidently, this is more realistic in CR networks. To sum-
marize, the contributions of this paper lie in the fact that
we study the SUs’ joining behavior in CR networks with a
single bandwidth under imperfect spectrum sensing along
with constant retrial queueing system for the first time.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the model descriptions. In Section 3, we derive the aver-
age sojourn time for the arriving SUs who decide to
enter the cognitive radio base station when they are not
informed the system’s information with imperfect spec-
trum sensing. The equilibrium joining probabilities and
socially optimal strategies of SUs are derived. An appro-
priate admission fee is proposed to eliminate the differ-
ence between these two strategies. Section 4 illustrates
the effect of various performance measures on the sys-
tem by analytical and numerical comparisons. Finally, in
Section 5, we give some conclusions.
2 Systemmodel
We consider a cognitive radio base station which incor-
porates a single PU band that is shared by SUs. It means
that the PU band can transmit either one PU packet or
one SU packet at one time. We regard the PU band as
a server. As PUs have high priorities to use the band,
an emerging PU should be served immediately no mat-
ter whether the band is serving an SU or in an idle state.
SUs can opportunistically use the band when it is not
occupied.
The primary SUs and PUs arrive to the system accord-
ing to a Poisson process with rates λs and λp, respectively.
The service time for SUs (or PUs) follows an exponen-
tial distribution with rate μs (or μp). If the server is free
when an SU arrives, the SU starts service immediately.
Otherwise, if the arriving SU finds the server unavail-
able or an SU in service is squeezed out by an PU, in
both cases, the SU will enter an artificial waiting space
called “retrial orbit” in order. When the PU band becomes
idle, it will be sensed by the first SU in the orbit and
the inter-sensing time follows an exponential distribution
with parameter θ . The arrival processes of PUs and SUs,
service processes of PUs and SUs, sensing process, and
retrial process of SUs are mutually independent of each
other.
If the spectrum sensing is perfect, the QoS experienced
by PUs should not be affected by the SUs. However, in
practice, a PU may experience disruptions by the SUs’
imperfect sensing. The first case is that if a secondary user
searches for the occupied band incorrectly as idle status,
collisions will occur. The second kind of disruption to a
PU may occur when an ongoing SU transmitting on a
given band fails to detect the emergence of an arriving
primary user on that band. We refer to these two detec-
tion errors as class-A and class-B misdetection events,
respectively. In this paper, we will only consider class-B
misdetection events.
Misdetection events can negatively impact the perfor-
mance of the system. When a misdetection event occurs,
an ongoing SU may incorrectly detect that there is no PU
arriving, but in fact, there is a PU entering the band. The
PU will be blocked and the SU will be dropped into the
retrial orbit at the same time. Meanwhile, a false alarm
may also happen when an ongoing SU incorrectly detects
the presence of a PU on the same channel, but in fact,
there is no PU entering the channel. Once this occurs, the
SU will be dropped into the retrial orbit. In this paper, we
denote by pm and pf the probabilities of misdetection and
false alarm, respectively.
Every arriving SU who wants to get service at the cog-
nitive radio base station can decide whether or not to join
the system. We will consider the unobservable case that
SUs do not know the information (i.e., whether the PU
band is available or not and the total SUs in the retrial
orbit) about the system. After each service completed, an
SU will get a reward of R units. And the cost for delay
in the system is charged by C units pet time unit. All
SUs want to maximize their own benefit and they are
risk neutral. It is irrevocable for their decisions on join-
ing or balking according to their assessment on the reward
against the costs.
In the game-theoretic spectrum sharing model depicted
in Fig. 1, we characterize SUs’ strategies by a value q ∈
[ 0, 1] which is the probability an SU decides to enter the
system (thus, with probability 1 − q, the SU decides to
leave the system), i.e., the effective entering probability for
SUs is λsq. As all SUs are allowed to take their own deci-
sions, this system can be regarded as a non-cooperative
game and the aim of our investigation is to derive the sym-
metric Nash equilibria.We will study the SUs’ equilibrium
behavior and socially optimal strategies in the unobserv-
able retrial queueing systems under the impact of sensing
failures. Moreover, to use the PU band more efficiently
and eliminate the difference between the equilibrium and
the socially optimal strategies, we propose an effective
approach of imposing an appropriate admission fee for
SUs that decide to join the system. This control policy can
induce individually optimizing SUs to behave in a socially
optimal way and therefore to utilize the spectrum more
economically.
For convenience, all notations used in this paper
are listed in Table 1. For simplicity, denote by
η ≡ (1 − pm − pf
)
λp and ξ ≡ pmλp + pf μs,
respectively.
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Fig. 1 Game-theoretic spectrum sharing model with imperfect sensing
3 Equilibrium analysis and optimal control
In this section, we first study the stability condition of this
system and then give a game-theoretic equilibrium anal-
ysis. An optimal control policy is discussed based on the
gap between equilibrium strategy and the socially optimal
strategy of SUs.
3.1 Stability condition and expected delay
Let (I(t),N(t)) represent the state of the system at time
Table 1 Important notations
Symbol Explanation
R Reward for each service
C Cost per time unit
λs Arrival rate for primary SUs
λp Arrival rate for primary PUs
μs Transmission rate for SUs
μp Transmission rate for PUs
θ Constant retrial rate
pm The probability of misdetection
pf The probability of false alarm
p Admission fee
t, where I(t) denotes the state of the server (0, idle; 1,
serving an SU; 2, serving a PU) andN(t) records the num-
ber of the customers in the retrial orbit. From the model
description, it is obvious that the process {I(t),N(t), t ≥
0} is a continuous Markov chain with state space  =
{(i, j), i = 0, 1, 2, j ≥ 0}. The system states and transition
rate diagram are shown in Fig. 2.
Proposition 1. The quasi-birth-and-death (QBD) pro-












Proof. The proof is given in Appendix 1.
Intuitively, the above condition enables the system not
being too loaded and guarantees the existence of station-
ary distribution of the underlying Markov chain. Denote
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Fig. 2 Transition rate diagram in the cognitive radio system
by p(i, j), the steady-state probability of state (i, j) and the




p(0, 0) = μpp(2, 0) + μsp(1, 0), (1)(
λp + λsq + θ
)
p(0, j) = μpp(2, j) + μsp(1, j)
+ ξp(1, j − 1), j = 1, 2, . . . ,
(2)
(μs + η + ξ + λsq) p(1, 0) = θp(0, 1) + λsqp(0, 0) (3)
(μs + η + ξ + λsq) p(1, j) = θp(0, j + 1) + λsqp(1, j − 1)




p(2, 0) = λpp(0, 0), (5)(
μp + λsq
)
p(2, j) = λpp(0, j) + λsqp(2, j − 1)
+ ηp(1, j − 1), j = 1, 2, . . . .
(6)




zjp(i, j), i = 0, 1, 2. (7)
Multiplying Eqs. (1)–(6) by zj and summing up over j,
we get the following equations.
(λp + λsq + θ)p0(z) − θp(0, 0) = μpp2(z) + μsp1(z)
+ξzp1(z), (8)
(μs + λsq(1 − z) + η + ξ)zp1(z) = (λsqz + θ)p0(z)
− θp(0, 0), (9)
(μp + λsq(1 − z))p2(z) = ηzp1(z) + λpp0(z).
(10)
After eliminating p(0, 0) from Eqs. (8) and (9) and com-
bining with Eq. (10), we get
λsqp0(z) = (μs − λsqz)p1(z) − λsqp2(z). (11)
Inserting z = 1 into Eqs. (10) and (11), we get the
relations between p0(1), p1(1) and p2(1) as follows:
p2(1) = λp(μs − λsq) + λsqη
(λp + μp)λsq p1(1),
p0(1) = μpμs − (μp + η)λsq
(λp + μp)λsq p1(1).
By virtue of the normalizing condition
∞∑
j=0
(p(0, j)+p(1, j)+p(2, j)) = p0(1)+p1(1)+p2(1) = 1,
we can get the probabilities that the PU band is idle, occu-
pied by an SU, or occupied by a PU, respectively, given
by

















The expected number of customers in the retrial orbit




jp(i, j), i = 0, 1, 2.
With the help of pi(z), we obtain that
E[Ri]= p′i(z)|z = 1.
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Differentiating Eqs. (8), (10), and (11), and taking z = 1
yields
(












λsqp′0(1) + λsqp1(1) = (μs − λsq) p′1(1) − λsqp′2(1).
(17)
From Eqs. (15)–(17), we can easily get the expressions
of p′0(1), p′1(1) and p′2(1). Hence, the expected number of








































(μs + η + ξ) .
(18)





Based on the results obtained above, the equilibrium
behavior of SUs is given as follows.
Theorem 1. In the considered model, a unique mixed





0, if R ≤ CT(0),
qe∗, if CT(0) < R < CT(1),
1, R ≥ CT(1),
(20)
where qe∗ satisfies the equation CT(qe∗) = R.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix 2.
Remark 1. Suppose that q is the joining probability of
other arriving SUs, if q < qe, we can conclude that the
expected net benefit of the tagged SU is positive once he
enters the system. In this case, the unique response is 1.
Similarly, the unique best response is 0 if q > qe. What is
more, any strategy between 0 and 1 is a best response if
q = qe. This shows that an individual’s best response is an
decreasing function of the strategy by the others, i.e., the
higher the joining probability selected by the others, the
lower is one’s best response. Therefore, we have an “avoid
the crowd” (ATC) situation. We conclude that qe is the
unique equilibrium strategy.
3.3 Socially optimal strategy
Now, we turn our attention to social optimization. In the
real situation where resources are limited, this queueing
system considered from a social point of view is of great
significance. The social objective function is defined as
Ssoc = λsq(R − CT(q)), (21)
where λsq is the effective arrival rate. Let qsoc be the
optimal joining strategy. By solving






we can get the following results.
Theorem 2. In the considered model, a unique socially
optimal joining probability qsoc adopted by the SUs which




0, q∗ ≤ 0,
q∗, if 0 < q∗ < 1,
1, if q∗ ≥ 1.
(23)
Proof. Since T(q) is increasing with q, the function
to be maximized is strictly concave and has a unique
maximum q∗.
We can infer q∗ ≤ qe due to d(Ssoc)dq |q=qe = λs(R −
CT(qe)) − λsqeC dT(q)dq |q=qe ≤ 0. It shows that individ-
ual optimization leads to a longer queue than the desired
socially optimal strategy. We can impose an appropriate
admission fee on the SUs who enter the system to gap this
difference.
3.4 Admission fee
We have derived the equilibrium strategy and the social
optimization strategy of SUs upon arrival. It is easy to see
that these two strategies do not coincide with each other,
and the relationship q∗ ≤ qe holds. From the manage-
rial point of view, this leads to the fact that the limited
resources will be used excessively, as all users want tomax-
imize their own benefit regardless of others. In order to
reduce the gap between individual and social optimization
and let SUs behave in a socially optimal way, the adminis-
trator of the cognitive radio base station is likely to impose
a constant admission fee p on SUs when they decide to
enter the system.
When the admission fee p is imposed, the reward for
an SU who enters the system is reduced into R − p. As
the administrator absorbs every SU’s surplus, then the
equilibrium joining strategy qe(p) is changed into
1) R − p ≤ CT(0): qe(p) = 0;
2) CT(0) < R − p < CT(1): qe(p) satisfies the equation
CT(qe(p)) = R − p;
3) R − p ≥ CT(1): qe(p) = 1.
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Under the condition of being imposed an admission
fee, the social benefit of the system is λq[R − p −
CE[T(λ)] ]+λqp which equals to Ssoc. Note that as the
admission fee p has no effect on the social objective func-
tion, the final socially optimal joining strategy will not be
changed. To eliminate the difference between the equi-
librium joining strategy and the socially optimal solution,
an optimal admission fee p∗ should satisfy the equation
qsoc = qe(p∗).
4 Numerical examples
In this section, we focus on the effects of different param-
eters on the behavior of SUs via numerical examples.
More concretely, we first examine how the equilibrium
and socially optimal entrance probabilities are affected by
changing the values of parameters λ, μ, η, β , θ , and R. It
is not hard to find that q∗ is smaller than qe in all these
figures, as explained before. The impact of misdetections
on equilibrium and socially optimal behavior can also be
observed.
It is shown in Fig. 3 that both qe and q∗ are decreasing
as the arrival rate λs increases. This is because when λs
increases, arriving SUs who do not know whether the PU
band is available or not will see more blocked SUs waiting
in the retrial orbit. So the arriving SUs are less inclined to
join the orbit to avoid more waiting cost as they are not
allowed to balk during their waiting. Figure 4 depicts the
influence of service rateμs on the strategic entrance prob-
abilities. We observe that qe and q∗ are increasing with
respect to μs. It can be explained that the increasing ser-
vice rate of PU band benefits SUs waiting in the retrial
orbit as the completing service time for SUs get faster. As
in Fig. 5, the strategic entrance probabilities decreases as
the arrival rate λp of PUs increases. This is due to the
priority of PUs, and when λp increases, the interruption
times per unit become more frequent. The server needs
some time to serve the PU. So SUs are reluctant to join the
orbit upon arrival. The system will get more loaded as the
server’s breakdown become more frequent. Considering
the influence of μp on these two entrance probabilities,
we observe in Fig. 6 that along with the increasing of μp,
the expected sojourn time for an PU becomes shorter.
There will be more opportunities for arriving SUs who
stay in the orbit to use the PU band. When it comes to θ
in Fig. 7, PUs are more willing to join the system in pace
with the increasing retrial rate of the SUs in orbit. When
θ increases, SUs will have more probabilities to get suc-
cessful to retry for using the PU band during the same
period. All the above figures show that the equilibrium
strategies of SU are larger than the socially optimal strat-
egy, so it is of significance to impose an admission on
the administrator of the network. As for the impact of
the probabilities of misdetection and false alarm on the
behavior of SUs, it can be seen from Fig. 8 that arriv-
ing SUs will be more likely to enter the system as pm
increases and the phenomenon is reverse as pf increases.
Because the arriving PU will be forced to drop when mis-
detection occurs, the SUs’ waiting time in the retrial orbit
will be reduced. However, if pf increases, the SU who is
in service tends to give up and enters the retrial orbit,
which incurs negative externalities on those who stay in
the retrial orbit. The same phenomenon is observed for
the maximum social strategies as shown in Fig. 9. It is
interesting to see that in Fig. 10, the arriving SUs will
be imposed more fees as pm increases or pf decreases,
because the amount of SUs in the system will increase
in both cases and the negative externalities lead to these
results.



























Fig. 3 Equilibrium and social optimization joining probabilities vs. λs for R = 10, C = 1, μs = 2, λp = 0.4, μp = 2, θ = 0.7, pm = 0.001, and
pf = 0.001
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Fig. 4 Equilibrium and social optimization joining probabilities vs. μs for R = 10, C = 1, λs = 0.4, λp = 0.4, μp = 2, θ = 0.7, pm = 0.001, and
pf = 0.001



























Fig. 5 Equilibrium and social optimization joining probabilities vs. λp for R = 10, C = 1, μs = 2, λs = 0.4, μp = 2, θ = 0.7, pm = 0.001, and
pf = 0.001



























Fig. 6 Equilibrium and social optimization joining probabilities vs.μp for R = 10, C = 1,μs = 2, λp = 0.4, λs = 0.4, θ = 0.7, pm = 0.01, and pf = 0.01
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Fig. 7 Equilibrium and social optimization joining probabilities vs. θ for R = 10, C = 1, μs = 2, λs = 0.4, λp = 0.4, μp = 2, pm = 0.01, and pf = 0.01
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we considered the SUs’ joining behavior in
cognitive radio network with a single bandwidth under
imperfect spectrum sensing. We used the constant retrial
queueing system with server breakdowns to model the
actual situations in which the PUs own priority over SUs
and SUs will retry their luck for service if interrupted
or blocked upon arrival. The SUs’ joining behavior were
described from an economic viewpoint based on game-
theoretic analysis. The equilibrium and socially optimal
strategies of SUs were investigated. It was shown that the
equilibrium strategy is greater than the socially optimal
strategy, and it was verified through numerical examples.
To eliminate the gap between equilibrium strategy and
socially optimal strategy, we proposed a control policy
that imposes an admission fee on each joining SU in order
to utilize the PU band more efficiently.
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Using the lexicographical sequence for the states,
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Fig. 8 Equilibrium strategies vs. pm for R = 15, C = 3, μs = 2, λs = 0.4, λp = 0.5, μp = 2, and θ = 0.7
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)
λsq λp















Due to the block structure of matrix Q, {I(t),N(t)} is
called a quasi-birth-and-death (QBD) process.































Fig. 10 Admission fee vs. pm for R = 10, C = 1,μs = 2, λs = 0.4, λp = 0.4,μp = 2, and θ = 0.7





−(θ + λsq + λp) θ + λsq λp




Since D is reducible, the Theorem 7.3.1 in [19] gives the
condition for positive recurrence of the QBD. After per-
mutation of rows and columns, the Theorem 7.3.1 states
















where 1 is a column vector with all elements equal to one,
and υ is the unique solution υD = 0,υ1 = 1. After
some algebraic manipulation, the QBD process is positive











are established. The right side of the inequality is always
greater than zero which infers to
μpμs > λsq(μp + η).
Therefore, the Eqs. from (12) to (14) are greater than
zero which is reasonable.
Appendix 2: Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The expected waiting time of the tagged SU who
choose to enter system is increasing with the same strate-
gies q adopted by other SUs. We can output the expected
waiting time as in (25).
T(q)



































(μs + η + ξ) .
(25)
Differentiating the denominator in the second fraction
(denoted as g(q)) of T we can obtain
g′(q) = −λs (2λsq + θ)
(
μp + η
)− λsλp (μs + η + ξ)
− λsμp (η + ξ) < 0.
Thus, it is decreasing with q. Observing the whole
expression of T, it is mean to identify the monotonicity
of λp(μs−λsq)+λsqηg(q) . It is easier to prove the inverse fac-
tion which is g(q)
λp(μs−λsq)+λsqη is monotone decreasing as q
increases. Just differentiate the objective function, and we
omitted it.
Therefore, the payoff for the tagged SU who chooses to
enter the system (means that the tagged SU selects the
strategy 1) when all others select strategy q is
S(q) = R − CT(q).
For all the arriving SUs, each has two pure strategies: to
join or balk and a mixed strategy. We denote these pure
and mixed strategies by a fraction q, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. So the
mixed strategy means an SU enters the system with prob-
ability q and not to join with probability 1 − q. Let qe be
the individual equilibrium strategy of each SU, then we
analyze the equilibrium behavior of arriving SUs as three
cases below:
1) R ≤ CT(0). An SU who joins can get a negative
benefit when there are no other SUs entering the
system. So his decision is not to join. Therefore, the
strategy of joining with probability qe = 0 is an
equilibrium strategy.
2) CT(0) < R < CT(1). We can specify that if qe = 1,
then an SU who joins gets a negative benefit. So this
is not an equilibrium strategy. If qe = 0, an SU who
joins obtains a positive profit which is more than by
balking (the benefit is 0). Thus, this is not an
equilibrium strategy too. Therefore, there exists a
unique equilibrium strategy qe such that CT(qe) = R.
3) R ≥ CT(1). In this case, any arriving SU will obtain a
non-negative profit even if all other SUs join the
system. So, the only one equilibrium strategy of
joining the system is qe = 1. And joining is a
dominant strategy.
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